Ramanathan’s work focuses on nuclear strategy, outer space affairs, and advanced military technologies. He has co-edited the book — ‘The Sheathed Sword: From Nuclear Brink to No First Use’. He explained that “India is not interested in competing with the Chinese on numbers.

Instead, we are developing specific capabilities to ensure we can hit back effectively. India is increasing the survivability of its own nuclear forces by deploying Arihant-class ballistic missile submarines. At some point, we will also probably set up an airborne command post to ensure that nuclear command and control can continue operating after a devastating first strike.

India also wants to ensure it can penetrate Chinese missile defences, which is why it is developing the new Agni V missile that can carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or MIRVs,” said Ramanthan.

Regarding Pakistan, he added that “India will always have to keep a close eye on developments in Pakistan as well.”

He added that the perceived threat may not just be from India’s immediate neighbours. “Over longer time horizons, we may see new nuclear powers emerging in West Asia as well. It could be Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, or Iran. So it makes sense for India to gradually update its nuclear forces and perhaps make slight increases in numbers when necessary.”

On India’s nuclear No-First-Use (NFU) policy, Ramanathan said that “India’s not interested in fighting a nuclear war. It only wants to convince adversaries that if they initiate a nuclear first strike, they have no means to stop India from conducting a terrible retaliatory strike.

NFU policy understands that the most effective use of nuclear weapons is to deter adversaries from using their own weapons of mass destruction. The idea is to prevent nuclear war and make it difficult for adversaries to make nuclear threats during a crisis,” he added.