After the moderate Rouhani government was weakened by the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, the Guardian Council, the conservative-dominated vetting body, has been systematically disqualifying the majority of reformist and moderate candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections. Khamenei has backed conservative control of all branches of powers — parliament, judiciary and presidency — when the Islamic Republic is facing severe internal and external challenges and a generational change in political leadership. Protesting against disqualifications that restricted the voters’ choice, reformists, including former president Mohammad Khatami, boycotted recent elections. Amid the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests, Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, who has remained under house arrest since 2011, called for a referendum on Iran’s political system and the drafting of a new democratic constitution. Even moderate leaders such as Rouhani and Javad Zarif have decried the “rule of minority”. In this context, the approval of Pezeshkian, a five-term parliamentarian from East Azerbaijan province and a prominent reformist disqualified in the 2021 presidential election, was a surprise. In a bid to attract alienated voters, Pezeshkian adopted Baraye Iran (For Iran), the anthem of the recent protests, as his campaign slogan.

While Mousavi still did not vote, Khatami, Rouhani, and Zarif supported Pezeshkian’s campaign. Still, the manoeuvre to bring reformists back to the political arena to counter voter apathy has largely failed to attract the “grey voters” — a term for reform-minded individuals who usually don’t cast their ballots. The only exception was the capital, Tehran, which usually sees the worst turnout. It saw an increase of 10.6% in polling, possibly in the favour of Pezeshkian. Further, the border provinces of Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan, inhabited by ethnic and Sunni minorities, recorded the lowest turnout. The non-participation of 60% of the electorate underscores the deep dissatisfaction with the political system.

Pezeshkian’s lead, despite the low turnout, has overturned the conventional wisdom that reformist prospects depend on high turnout. The most plausible explanation is a shift of conservative votes in his favour. Jalili and Ghalibaf together garnered 12.8 million votes, a decline of 5.2 million from the 2021 elections when Raisi emerged victorious with no serious challenger. Pezeshkian, who is an ethnic Azeri Turk and has represented Tabriz in parliament since 2008, recorded a wide lead over the conservatives in the three north-western provinces, where the majority of Azeris (comprising 16% of Iran’s population) live. Pezeshkian’s campaign focus on addressing the long-standing neglect of border areas and ensuring the inclusion of Sunni Muslims and ethnic minorities in government posts may have helped in making inroads into traditionally conservative votes in these regions.

Another notable feature of the elections was the intensive power struggle within the conservative camp. In the March 2024 parliamentary elections, a younger generation of hardline clerics such as Mahmoud Nabavian and Hamid Rasaee, at the helm of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability (known by its Persian acronym Paydari), had carried out an “anti-Ghalibaf” campaign focussed on corruption allegations against him. Ghalibaf, who had secured the highest votes in Tehran in the 2020 parliament, fell to fourth place. Paydari is the most fundamentalist political group in the conservative spectrum. Unlike the pragmatic conservatives like Ghalibaf, it favours a rigid version of Islamic law and is fiercely critical of the reformist cause of social and cultural freedoms and diplomacy with the West, denouncing them as seditionists. Paydari supported Jalili, who owes his power and authority to Khamenei and is known for his uncompromising stance as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, Ghalibaf, driven by personal ambition and the support of power networks he cultivated during his career spanning the IRGC, Tehran municipality, and parliament, refused to withdraw in Jalili’s favour even after the pre-election surveys indicated Jalili’s substantial lead over him. Even an intervention by IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmaeil Qa’ami failed to convince either Jalili or Ghalibaf to withdraw. Subsequently, a triangular contest made a run-off including Pezeshkian almost inevitable. After the defeat, Ghalibaf extended support to Jalili.

The Pezeshkian-Jalili run-off on July 5 will be a showdown between the two most polarising political visions for the country. The whole of the conservative apparatus, including the Basij, a million-strong volunteer paramilitary organisation that led the crackdown on the reformist Green Movement and anti-mandatory hijab protests, will mobilise for Jalil. Pezeshkian’s fate depends on whether he can finally move the grey voters.