Sudan’s political crisis reached a critical point in December 2018, when widespread protests erupted against President Omar al-Bashir’s regime. The demonstrations, sparked by economic grievances, quickly morphed into demands for political change, culminating in al-Bashir’s ouster in April 2019. However, the path to stability has been fraught with challenges.
The Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of civilian opposition groups, found themselves at odds over the direction of the country’s future. The situation escalated further with the violent crackdown on protesters in June 2019, which left over 100 people dead and hundreds injured. The international community watched with bated breath as Sudan teetered on the brink of chaos.
According to the World Bank, Sudan’s GDP growth rate plummeted to -3.6% in 2019, reflecting the economic turmoil and uncertainty that accompanied the political transition. Inflation soared, reaching a staggering 269% in December 2020, exacerbating the economic hardship faced by ordinary Sudanese citizens.
In terms of human development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that Sudan ranked 170th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index in 2019, highlighting the pressing need for socio-economic reforms alongside political stabilization. These statistics underscore the multifaceted nature of Sudan’s crisis, where political, economic, and social dimensions are deeply intertwined.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Sudan’s army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Port Sudan, marking the first visit by a foreign leader to Burhan’s wartime headquarters since the conflict began between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Previously perceived as being closer to the RSF and having hosted its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in Addis Ababa in December, Abiy presented this visit as an effort to stabilize Sudan after nearly 15 months of fighting.
The war between the Sudanese military factions has displaced nearly 10 million people, led to famine-like conditions in parts of Sudan, and threatened regional stability. While the RSF controls most of Khartoum and central and western Sudan, the army holds the eastern and northern regions, including Port Sudan, which serves as its base.
Attempts to broker a ceasefire through talks in Jeddah, hosted by Saudi Arabia and the United States, stalled last year, and efforts to bring the army back to negotiations have been unsuccessful.
Following an RSF attack on Sennar state last month, the conflict neared Sudan’s border with Ethiopia, with signs of the RSF moving into Gedaref state, home to over 600,000 displaced Sudanese and tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees. Last month, Sudanese farmers reported that Ethiopian Fano militiamen had entered the disputed Fashaga territory. In a speech on Monday, Abiy stated he would not exploit the war to settle territorial disputes and that his government would not take sides.
Abiy’s visit to Port Sudan also took place despite past tensions with the army. RSF leader Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, previously chose Addis Ababa to meet the civilian Taqaddum coalition, which the army has criticized. Last year, one of Burhan’s deputies alleged that Ethiopian fighters were supporting the RSF.
As an ally of the United Arab Emirates, accused by the army of providing material support to the RSF—allegations denied by the UAE but deemed credible by U.N. experts—Abiy’s potential role as a mediator is in question. Alan Boswell, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa project director, commented on whether Abiy could mediate between Burhan and the UAE or convey messages between them.
In the end, the success of Sudan’s transition hinges not only on political agreements but on the resilience and determination of its people. As the nation navigates the complexities of rebuilding, there is cautious optimism and unwavering support. The question remains: Can peace be achieved?.