The country is facing threats from local Islamist networks and also social media-driven attacks by ‘handlers’ based abroad, who may be linked to the remnants of ISIS or Al Qaeda
Within three months of the high casualty attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow, June 23 witnessed near-simultaneous terror attacks across the cities of Derbent and Makhachkala in the Republic of Dagestan in Russia. The terrorists targeted synagogues, churches and police posts in prolonged frontal attacks. More than 20 people — policemen, citizens and six attackers — were killed in pitched battles and 50 injured. A scrutiny of recent attacks and the overall security environment points to two distinct threats emerging in Russia — both closely linked to geopolitical developments.
A week before the Dagestan attacks, in Rostov city, Russian forces killed six Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-linked Russian nationals, while rescuing security guards held hostage by them to get free passage. In April, in Dagestan, the forces had detained four members of a cell — all foreign nationals who channelled funds and provided weapons for the Crocus City Hall attack.
Previous attacks
Last year, on October 29, a local mob brandishing Palestinian flags stormed the Makhachkala International Airport and reached the tarmac, looking for Israeli passengers who they believed were on a flight from Tel Aviv. Several people, including police officers, were injured in the assault. Earlier on, the locals had besieged a hotel in the city looking for Israeli guests. A strong anti-Israeli public sentiment had been building up in Dagestan for a while and on that day, a popular Telegram channel had flashed the news about a direct flight coming from Tel Aviv. The June 23 attacks too appear to be driven by the same public sentiment. This time, terrorists struck intended targets.
Historically, the three majority Muslim republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia of the North Caucasus region have been the hubs of separatist resistance for a long time. The insurgencies became intense in the 1990s and early 2000s, especially of Chechen groups which carried out more than 27 suicide bombings in the early 2000s against military bases, subways, airliners, rock concerts, etc, across the region and other parts of Russia.
Around 2007, an al Qaeda (AQ)-associated group, Emarat Kavkaz, emerged from the region. It carried out several suicide attacks in Russian cities, including the bombing of the Domodedovo International Airport in Moscow. The UN designated the group as an associate of AQ in 2011, stating that the group had cells in Europe, apart from close connections with Central Asian terror groups and the Chechen separatist movement. From 2012, with the rise of ISIS across Iraq and Syria, thousands of people from the North Caucasus and Central Asia were either recruited or moved to “the Caliphate” of their own volition. Several of these people also switched to the AQ’s Syria branch — the Al Nusrah Front (ANF), now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — which continues to hold territory in the region.
Russia became a target for both ISIS and AQ, as it had been actively supporting the Assad regime’s forces against the HTS and ISIS and coordinating its air campaign against ISIS in Syria with the US-led coalition till 2017. ISIS bombed a Russian plane flying from Sharm-el-sheikh in Egypt to St Petersburg in 2015 killing over 200 passengers. In 2017, a suicide bomber blew himself up on a metro in St Petersburg. A group alleged to be an AQ affiliate from the North Caucasus called the Katiba-al-Imam-Shamil claimed responsibility.
Terror returns
Interestingly, in 2017, Russia formally declared the end of armed insurgencies in the North Caucasus and since then, has also managed to prevent big attacks on the homeland. After a gap of six years, how should the attacks in Russia in 2024 be viewed?
The officials in Dagestan have admitted involvement of locals, including relatives of a high-ranking official. The coordinated attacks point to advanced planning by a well-trained network. Though social media has attributed the attacks to Wilayat Kavkaz, the claim has not been found to be genuine so far. The investigators are probing the role of a popular social media influencer in the attacks, most likely for radicalisation. However, the message of the attacks is in line with the strong public sentiment on the plight of Palestinians in Gaza.
Russia is thus facing threats from local Islamist networks and also social media-driven attacks by “handlers” based abroad, who may be linked to remnants of ISIS or AQ. While it would be easier for Russia to trace local networks and contain radicalisation, it would be much harder to reach the masterminds of externally driven attacks. Apart from the anonymity and multi-layered operational planning of such operations, the near absence of counter-terrorism cooperation with the US-led West would be an obstacle. It is pertinent to point out that the cooperation with the West had weakened long before the Ukraine war, as stated in the US country report on terrorism 2017. Despite such grave and rising threats, the global community stands much more divided due to two active wars across Europe and the Middle East.