FACTS

The case of the Respondent who was a Senior Officer in the service of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (the 1st Appellant) is that he was arrested and wrongfully detained in the cell of the 1st Appellant. He brought an application before the trial Court to enforce his fundamental rights.

After hearing all the parties, the trial Court in a considered judgment found in favour of the Respondent. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The appeal was determined the issue of whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that the Appellants violated the fundamental rights of the Respondent and therefore he entitled to damages.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSION

Appellants’ counsel submitted that there was evidence to justify the restraint on the Respondent’s movement. He submitted too that the 21 per cent post-judgment interest awarded against the Appellants was raised by the trial Court suo motu and this occasioned a miscarriage of justice; OJELEYE VS. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF ONA IWA MIMO CHERUBIM AND SERAPHIM CHURCH OF NIGERIA (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 1111) 520.

Appellants’ counsel also submitted that the award of damages by the trial Court was perverse and unrealistic; ODOGU VS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (1996) 6 NWLR (PT. 456)508.

Appellants’ counsel finally submitted that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s action.

The basis of the complaint of the Appellants on the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the action before it was the pendency of a criminal charge against the Respondent at the time of hearing of the application for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSION

Respondent’s counsel submitted that the affidavit evidence detailing the Respondent’s arrest was neither challenged, discredited nor contradicted and as such the trial Court could rely upon it; CHABASAYA VS. ANWASI (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1201)163.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES

The Court held that jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to an action in a Court of law and any action heard and decided without jurisdiction is a nullity. See ODUAH VS. OKADIGBO (2019) 3 NWLR (PT. 1660) 433. The Court further held that the pendency of a criminal charge against a person for which he has not been found guilty would not deny him access to a Court to enforce his fundamental rights where he feels same has been infringed. See IHIM VS. MADUAGWU (2021) 5 NWLR (PT. 1770) 584 at 616, Paragraphs C-D.

The Court also held that by virtue of Section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 jurisdiction to hear fundamental rights actions is vested in the High Court.

And by virtue of FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA VS. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 842)113 at 178 PARAGRAPHS A-B, it is the principal relief endorsed on the application filed that determines the Court’s jurisdiction. Since the Respondent from the relief sought alleged that his fundamental right has been breached by the Appellants, the trial Court was right when it assumed jurisdiction.

The Court held that a person who admits the detention of another by him has a duty to prove that the detention was lawful. See DIRECTOR STATE SECURITY SERVICES VS. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (PT. 595)314.

The Court held that the fundamental right of a Nigerian citizen is guaranteed by the Constitution. See Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

However, the Court held that the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV are not absolute but can be curtailed in the course of judicial inquiry or where the Defendant is arrested and detained upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a felony.

The Court held that a party who leads evidence of the existence of a document in proof of his case is obliged to present it before the Court. The law does not allow oral evidence in proof of a document. See ABUBAKAR VS. WAZIRI (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1108) 507. The Appellants who relied on a document justifying the arrest of the Respondent did not produce same in Court and as such the Court has no business pronouncing on it.

The Court held that though Section 41 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, Laws of the Federation, 2004 confers powers on the Appellants to arrest and detain any person whom it believes has committed an offence under the Act, such powers must, however, be exercised within the ambits of the law.

The Court further held that arrest and detention before investigation where there is no prima facie evidence that the suspect has committed the offence, is unconstitutional. See FAWEHINMI VS. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE (2002) 7 NWLR (PT. 767) 606.

The Court further held that though Section 35(4) and (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 allows the detention of a person for the purpose of bringing him before a Court upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, this shall be done within a reasonable time. Reasonable time in the case of where the Court is within forty Kilometers radius is twenty-four hours. See AKILA VS. DIRECTOR GENERAL, STATE SECURITY SERVICES (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1392) 443.

In considering the contention of the Appellants that the trial Court did not take into cognisance the number of days for which the Appellants can detain the Respondent before coming to the conclusion that the detention was unlawful, the Court still held that it is not every error or mistake by a Court that would warrant the reversal of the decision reached in the proceedings. Such decision would be reversed only where there is a miscarriage of justice. See ETIM VS. AKPAN (2019) 1 NWLR (PT. 1654) 451.

The Court, in considering the contention of the Appellants that the award of damages was excessive, held that by virtue of Section 35(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) once it is established that a person has been unlawfully arrested or detained, he is entitled to compensation and public apology. The award of damages in such circumstance is at the discretion of the Judge.

However, whatever compensation is awarded should reflect not only the pecuniary loss of the victim but also the abhorrence of society and the law for such gross violation of human rights. See MUHAMMAD VS. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (2019) 4 NWLR (PT. 1663) 492.

As regards the award of post-judgment interest, the Court held that although an award of post-judgment interest by a trial Court is discretionary, the Rules of Court provide for the limit of such interest. The Court held that by the Rules of the trial Court the maximum he could award is 10 per cent.

Thus, the Court held that the award of 21 per cent post judgment interest was ultra vires. See EKWUNIFE VS. WAYNE WEST AFRICA LTD (1989) 5 NWLR (PT. 122) 422. However, the Court ordered the Appellant to pay to the Respondent 10 per cent interest per annum on the damages of N7million awarded in his favour with effect from April 5, 2017 until same is fully liquidated.

HELD

The Court allowed in part, affirming the judgment of the trial Court and all orders made by it except the award of 21% post-judgment interest.

APPEARANCES:

I.J. IGWUBOR, Esq., Asst Chief Legal Officer, NDLEA                      For Appellant(s)

Abubakar Shamsudeen,                                                                – For 1st Respondent(s)