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Russian Horizontal Escalation – A Stealthy March to War?

sofrep.com 5 days ago

Introduction

As the Ukraine war stretches into its third year, Kyiv is desperate for money and weapons. As the United States and NATO stretch to provide assistance, their efforts bring increased risk of direct conflict with Russia.

Direct conflict – a Russian attack on US assets – is unlikely. No one wants to see rapid escalation between two nuclear-armed superpowers. What is much more likely is horizontal escalation.

The Russians view the US as waging a hybrid war, using Ukraine as a proxy. Rather than directly attacking US assets, it is more likely that Russia will provide sophisticated weapons to its own proxies and have those proxies attack US targets.

In this article, we look at two examples. First, Russia’s transfer of ICBM technology to North Korea, and second, Russia’s transfer of anti-ship missile technology to Syria, Hezbollah, Iran, and Yemen. In both cases, the transfer has already begun.

These examples are not exhaustive. Russia could also transfer weapons and technology to China, Cuba, Venezuela, and non-state actors like Latin American drug cartels. Those guys already buy our Javelins on the black market, why not pick up some Russian Kornet ATGMs right from the source?

The Demarche

In the wake of a Ukrainian ATACM missile strike on Crimea, the US ambassador to Moscow, Lynne Tracey, was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry. There, she was issued a demarche. A demarche is the strongest diplomatic protest a country can deliver. It is only issued under grave circumstances and contains a warning. The country issued the demarche has transgressed, and if corrective action is not taken, further consequences will follow.

The Ukrainians launched five ATACMs with cluster warheads. Russian air defense destroyed four. The fifth exploded over a beach near Sevastopol. One hundred and fifty civilians were injured. Half a dozen, including two children, were killed outright.

Russia accused the United States of supplying advanced weaponry to Ukraine and encouraging attacks on Russian territory. Russia further suggested that US crews provide targeting and input the missiles’ flight guidance. The US and Ukraine were accused of deliberately targeting civilians. The demarche concluded with important messages. First, the United States and the Russian Federation are no longer in a “state of peace.” The Russians consider the United States to be waging a “hybrid war.” Second, the incident cannot be ignored and retaliatory measures will follow.

Introduction

As the Ukraine war stretches into its third year, Kyiv is desperate for money and weapons. As the United States and NATO stretch to provide assistance, their efforts bring increased risk of direct conflict with Russia.

Direct conflict – a Russian attack on US assets – is unlikely. No one wants to see rapid escalation between two nuclear-armed superpowers. What is much more likely is horizontal escalation.

The Russians view the US as waging a hybrid war, using Ukraine as a proxy. Rather than directly attacking US assets, it is more likely that Russia will provide sophisticated weapons to its own proxies and have those proxies attack US targets.

In this article, we look at two examples. First, Russia’s transfer of ICBM technology to North Korea, and second, Russia’s transfer of anti-ship missile technology to Syria, Hezbollah, Iran, and Yemen. In both cases, the transfer has already begun.

These examples are not exhaustive. Russia could also transfer weapons and technology to China, Cuba, Venezuela, and non-state actors like Latin American drug cartels. Those guys already buy our Javelins on the black market, why not pick up some Russian Kornet ATGMs right from the source?

The Demarche

In the wake of a Ukrainian ATACM missile strike on Crimea, the US ambassador to Moscow, Lynne Tracey, was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry. There, she was issued a demarche. A demarche is the strongest diplomatic protest a country can deliver. It is only issued under grave circumstances and contains a warning. The country issued the demarche has transgressed, and if corrective action is not taken, further consequences will follow.

The Ukrainians launched five ATACMs with cluster warheads. Russian air defense destroyed four. The fifth exploded over a beach near Sevastopol. One hundred and fifty civilians were injured. Half a dozen, including two children, were killed outright.

Russia accused the United States of supplying advanced weaponry to Ukraine and encouraging attacks on Russian territory. Russia further suggested that US crews provide targeting and input the missiles’ flight guidance. The US and Ukraine were accused of deliberately targeting civilians. The demarche concluded with important messages. First, the United States and the Russian Federation are no longer in a “state of peace.” The Russians consider the United States to be waging a “hybrid war.” Second, the incident cannot be ignored and retaliatory measures will follow.

The phrase “no longer in a state of peace” falls short of declaring a “state of war.” Associated with “hybrid war,” this is analogous to, but broader than, “proxy war.”

This demarche is grounds for concern. The United States is not in the business of targeting civilians. Assistance is being rendered to Ukraine for defensive purposes. The US does not consider itself to be a cobelligerent. The administration has expressed its regret at collateral damage.

The circumstances of the incident remain unclear. The ATACMs were probably aimed at the Belbek air base near Sevastopol. Four were intercepted, but one went off course and exploded over the beach.

Whatever the truth, the risk of conflict is growing. While Russia could attack US assets, such a direct attack is unlikely. The more likely outcome is horizontal escalation. Since Russia views the US as waging a proxy war, Russia can do the same. It can supply advanced weapons to its own proxies.

Given that the US would never deliberately target civilians, the delivery of the Russian demarche is a puzzling provocation. It might have been issued to excuse the action Russia has already taken.

ICBM Technology: The Topol-M and North Korea’s Hwasong-18

North Korea has been working to develop nuclear ICBM technology for decades. On July 12, 2023, North Korea tested a Hwasong-18 missile. Two features of the launch were important. First, the platform was solid-fuelled, unlike earlier liquid fuel North Korean efforts. The missile becomes easier to transport and conceal. Second, the missile was equipped with a decoy canister. The missile has MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle) capability, and countermeasures to defeat anti-ballistic missile defenses.

Topol M
Figure 1. Topol-M solid fuel ICBM with MIRV and Decoys Payload.

Analysis of the Hwasong-18’s characteristics indicates that this weapon is a close derivative of the Russian Topol-M. The Russians must have given North Korea extensive assistance in its development. It is even possible that Russia provided examples of the Topol-M itself.

Figure 2. North Korean Hwasong-18 Solid Fuel, MIRV and Decoy-Equipped.

Compare the Topol-M in Figure 1 to the Hwasong-18 in Figure 2. They could be the same missile. The point is: we supply Ukraine with M1 Abrams, HIMARS, and ATACMs. The Russians supply North Korea with ICBMs.

Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT has analyzed the Hwasong-18 in detail. His analysis can be found here: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/

This development is a quantum leap in North Korean capability. Seven years ago, they could not hit Anchorage and Honolulu. It seemed they would take decades to reach the continental United States. With one stroke, Russia has given North Korea the ability to strike anywhere from San Francisco to New York and Washington, D.C.

Anti-Ship Missiles in the Middle East

Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel retaliated against Gaza. Tensions in the Middle East have escalated. The war is a complex affair, but there are at least three dynamics at play.

First, tensions between Hezbollah and Israel in the north have increased, and Israel is threatening war with Hezbollah. This would not be restricted to Lebanon but would certainly spill into Syria.

Second, the Houthi movement in Yemen, officially known as Ansar Allah, is supporting Hamas by attacking Israeli and Western shipping in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Yemen is using swarms of drones and missiles to attack US, UK, and European naval vessels, trying to keep the sea lanes open.

Third, Iran is supportive of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Ansar Allah.

The Middle East conflict has stretched on longer than anyone expected. The US and NATO have been unable to suppress Ansar Allah. Numerous commercial ships have been sunk or damaged. Commercial shipping through the Red Sea has dropped by ninety percent over five months. Delays (and cost overruns) have become the norm as ships use alternative routes.

Meanwhile, as Israel contemplates an assault on Hezbollah, the United States has transferred the carrier USS Eisenhower from the Red Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean to provide support. The Eisenhower has been at sea for almost nine months and is overdue for a rest. The US is sending the USS Theodore Roosevelt to provide welcome relief.

Russia has supplied Yakhont missiles (see Figure 3) to Syria and Hezbollah. The Yakhont is the export version of the P-800 Oniks-M, a ramjet-propelled, Mach 2.6 anti-ship missile. The Oniks-M has a maximum range of 500 miles and a CEP of 1.5 meters. The Yakhont has a range of 100 miles and is somewhat less accurate. For comparison, the USN Harpoon has a range of 75 miles at Mach 0.71. Exocet anti-ship missiles travel Mach 0.93.

Oniks
Figure 3. P-800 Oniks-M/Yakhont/Brahmos-I Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile

The Yakhont has been deployed to Syria and Hezbollah. The missiles are fired from Bastion mobile shore batteries (see Figure 4), which are easy to conceal.

Bastion mobile shore battery

This video shows the launch of Oniks from a Bastion battery. The missiles shown are not the longer-range Oniks-M variant.

During the Iran-Iraq war, an Iraqi jet fired two Exocets (Mach 0.93) at the frigate USS Stark. One struck the frigate, resulting in serious damage and loss of life. The crew managed to save the vessel. See Figure 5.

USS Stark
Figure 5. Frigate USS Stark, struck by Exocet in the Persian Gulf, 1987.

During the Falklands War, in 1982, the destroyer HMS Sheffield was struck by another Exocet launched by an Argentine Super Étendard (that same airplane may be gifted to Ukraine 42 years later). The destroyer was crippled and ultimately foundered (Figure 6).

HMS Sheffield
Figure 6. HMS Sheffield, sunk by Exocet missile, Falkland Islands, 1982.

Modern missiles are far more capable than the Exocets that sank the Sheffield and crippled the Stark. The Exocet and Harpoon are 1980s technology, and both are subsonic.

Russia can provide Oniks-M upgrades to the Yakhont missiles already supplied to Syria and Hezbollah. It can provide the same to Ansar Allah by way of Iran. Let’s be honest – they are sneaky enough to have already done so, just like they provided the Topol-M technology to North Korea last year.

The key thing to understand is that our vulnerability comes from range. In an excellent paper, “Retreat from range: the rise and fall of carrier aviation,” Captain Jerry Hendrix (Ret.) outlines the problem.

Captain Hendrix’s paper is here: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/retreat-from-range-the-rise-and-fall-of-carrier-aviation. Highly recommended.

During the Cold War, naval aviation was equipped to launch strikes deep into enemy territory. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States became the lone superpower.

There were consequences. First, military budgets shrank. Cold War carrier battle groups were configured into “strike” groups to project power against non-peer adversaries. As the lone superpower, the US had no peers. All the long-range aircraft of the air wing were consolidated into the highly capable but shorter-range F-18 Superhornet.

As far back as 1997, in his book, “The Future of War,” George Friedman warned that the proliferation of (relatively) cheap anti-ship missiles would push American carriers further away from littorals. This insight alone was reason to maintain longer-range platforms.

The F-18 Superhornet has a combat radius of 500 miles. Notice that’s the same as the maximum range of the P-800 Oniks-M. To launch an air strike with the Superhornet, the Eisenhower and the Theodore Roosevelt have to approach within 500 miles of the coast. That makes them vulnerable to the Oniks-M.

Our Aegis air defense screen is the most capable in the world. If Russia escalates horizontally and provides supersonic missiles to its proxies, our cruisers and destroyers are going to have to be on top of their game.

About the Author

Cameron Curtis
Cameron Curtis

Cameron Curtis has spent thirty years on trade floors as a trader and risk manager. He was on the trade floor when Saddam’s tanks rolled into Kuwait, when the air wars opened over Baghdad and Belgrade, and when the financial crisis swallowed the world. Having written fiction as a child, he is the author of the Breed action thriller series, available on Amazon.

Check out his new Breed thriller, BLOOD SPORT, here:

Breed Blood Sport

And visit the Breed series page here:

Disclaimer: SOFREP utilizes AI for image generation and article research. Occasionally, it’s like handing a chimpanzee the keys to your liquor cabinet. It’s not always perfect and if a mistake is made, we own up to it full stop. In a world where information comes at us in tidal waves, it is an important tool that helps us sift through the brass for live rounds.

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