In recent years, the Nigerian Supreme Court has issued a series of seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the applicability of limitation laws, particularly the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA), to employment contracts. This jurisprudential vacillation has created a climate of uncertainty among legal practitioners and lower courts alike, calling into question the principle of legal certainty that underpins our judicial system.
The discourse began in earnest with the 2018 decision in N.R.M.A. & F.C. v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247. In this landmark case, the apex Court held that Section 2 of the POPA, which stipulates a three-month limitation period for suits against public officers, does not apply to employment contract disputes. Hear their Lordships on pages 270 – 271, paras. F – B of the law report:
‘’There is no doubt, a careful reading of the Respondents’ claim will show clearly that it is a contract of service. It is now settled law that Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of contract…
I have no slightest difficulty in holding that the appellants are not covered by the Public Officers Protection Act as to render the Respondents’ action statute barred.
In sum I hold that the learned Justices of the court below are right in holding that the Appellants do not enjoy the umbrella of Pubic Officers Protection Law in the contract of service involving the Respondents…’’
This ruling was widely interpreted as a definitive statement on the matter, leading many practitioners like myself to abandon jurisdictional challenges based on limitation periods in employment cases before the National Industrial Court.
However, the legal landscape shifted in 2020 with the decision in Abdulrahman v. N.N.P.C. (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 405. While primarily concerned with interpreting Section 12(1) of the NNPC Act, the Apex Court made an obiter dictum suggesting that the 12-month limitation period for suits against the NNPC should apply to employment termination cases. This pronouncement, though not binding, introduced a note of ambiguity into what had seemed a settled area of law. Please see page 419, paras. C – D of the law report:
‘’Since the suit or relief sought was not against the termination of his employment, which suit or right would have abated 12 months after the termination of his employment on 26/4/2000, that is, since on 26/4/2001, the right to pension and medical benefits having been earned and owed as contained in the condition of service of the respondent, the action cannot be said to be statute barred. Thus, the allusion and reliance on Section 12(1) of the NNPC Act amounts to chasing the air by the Respondent.’’
The waters were further muddied in 2021 with the judgment in Idachaba v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2021) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1787) 209. In a direct contradiction to its earlier position, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that Section 2 of the POPA does indeed apply to employment contract cases. Please hear their Lordships on pages 226 – 227, paras. H – G:
‘’In the instant appeal, by the facts, pleadings and parties, it is deducible that the Appellants were employees of the 1st Respondent. It has been conceded by the Appellants already that both the Appellants and Respondents are public officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; the former in contract of employment or contract of service under the latter. It is without argument that they were both regulated by the Public Officers Protection Act…
Whatsoever might have brewed between the Appellants and the Respondents, what I have before me is that the Appellants’ appointments with the 1st Respondent were terminated sometime around 30/4/1999. By the above provision, they Appellants were by law supposed to institute their grievances, if any, within 3 months, of the purported termination of their employment. It is noted that the cause of action arose supposedly on 30/4/1999. Thus, the Appellants’ action was maintainable only within 3 months after the cause of action arose.’’
This decision represented a clear departure from the principle established in N.R.M.A. & F.C. v. Johnson (supra).
The Court of Appeal, grappling with these conflicting precedents, attempted to reconcile them in Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFUND) & Anor v. Dr. Aminu Abdulrahman Anas (2022) LPELR-58704 (CA). The Court reasoned that the Idachaba decision, being more recent, superseded the earlier decision in N.R.M.A. & F.C. v. Johnson. Consequently, it applied Section 2(a) of the POPA to find the suit before it was statute-barred. Please see pg. 39 – 47 of the law report, where his Lordship, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA held that:
“It is true that the Apex Court held in the case of N.R.M.A. & F.C. v. Johnson
& Ors (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247 at 270, D – H to 271, A – C per Ariwoola, JSC (Now Ag. CJN) that Public Officers Protection Act would not apply to contract of service…
However, the Apex Court appears to have moved away from the position it took in the above-cited case in the recent case of Mr. Idachaba & Ors v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2021) 1 SCM 53 at 64, H – I to 66, A… The law is now trite that where there are two conflicting decisions of the Apex Court, this Court is bound to follow the latter decisions…
I am of the firm view that having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in IDACHABA’s case supra, the provision of the Public Officer Protection Act, Section 2(a) thereof and Section 13 of the Tetfund Act are applicable to the Respondent’s suit and the said suit having been instituted well over 3 months after the letter of the Respondent’s retirement was issued and served on the Respondent, the Respondent’s suit instituted on 18/1/2021 is statute barred and the right to sue had been extinguished.”
I am aware that in several cases, the National Industrial Court has also applied the Idachaba precedent. Notable examples include Goddy Ezezobu Obaneke v. NDLEA unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/77/2023 delivered on the 20th day of July 2023 and Akudo Akwarandu v. Jbis Integrated Resources Limited unreported Suit No:
NICN/PHC/04/2023 delivered on the 29th May 2024, where the National Industrial Court held that limitation laws are indeed applicable to employment contracts and declined jurisdiction to entertain the suits for being statute barred.
Just when it seemed the issue had been settled, the Supreme Court introduced a new twist with its 2nd December 2022 decision reported in Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila (2024) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1944) 529. In what appears to be a reversal of Idachaba, the Court reverted to its original position that the POPA does not apply to employment contracts. Please see pg. 544, paras. E – H of the law report, where it was held that:
“From the facts on record, it is not in contention that the controversy between the parties herein relates to the contract of employment between them. The respondents as plaintiffs commenced the instant suit challenging the alleged alteration of their retirement age from sixty-five years to sixty years by the appellants contrary to what the parties have agreed.
It has long been settled by this court that the Public Officers (Protection) Law the appellants rest their challenge to the competence of this suit does not apply in breach of contract cases…
In Rahamaniya United Nigeria Limited v. Minister of Federal Capital Territory, (2021) LPELR – 55633 (SC); (2021) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1806) 481, this court pointedly restated the principle that the Public Officers Protection Act/Law is not intended by the legislature to apply to contracts. Accordingly, since respondents’ instant action is grounded in contract, the defence the appellants seek to raise remains legally unavailing. I so hold.”
This latest pronouncement of the Apex Court has reignited the debate and deepened the existing legal uncertainty.
The current state of affairs presents a clear conflict between two lines of Supreme Court decisions: N.R.M.A. & F.C. v. Johnson and Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila on one side, and Idachaba v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi on the other. This inconsistency has created a challenging environment for litigants, legal practitioners, and lower courts, all of whom must navigate these conflicting precedents.
The situation is particularly precarious for the Court of Appeal, which serves as the final arbiter for decisions from the National Industrial Court. As demonstrated in the Tetfund case, the Court of Appeal may find itself in the unenviable position of dismissing an appeal based on what it believes to be the current Supreme Court position, only to have that position subsequently reversed.
Legal certainty, a cornerstone of our juridical system, is undoubtedly compromised by these fluctuating precedents. It is imperative that the Supreme Court seize the next available opportunity to provide a definitive and consistent ruling on this matter. Only then can we hope to restore clarity and predictability to this crucial area of employment law.
As the legal community awaits such a clarifying decision, practitioners must remain vigilant, carefully scrutinizing each new pronouncement from the apex court. In the interim, the prudent approach may be to advise clients to err on the side of caution, initiating actions within the shorter limitation periods where applicable, while being prepared to argue for the non-applicability of such limitations if necessary.
As we navigate these turbulent waters, it is our collective responsibility as members of the legal profession to continue engaging in robust discourse on this issue. Through such dialogue, we can hope to influence the eventual resolution of this jurisprudential conundrum, contributing to the development of a more coherent and predictable body of employment law in Nigeria.